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1 INTRODUCTION
The idea of linking relief and development, although
current since the mid-1980s, has grown in promi-
nence since the Gulf War and the increasing interna-
tional preoccupation with humanitarian relief. Nev-
ertheless, within development agencies, the nature
of the link between relief and development, and what
this might mean in practice, remains far from clear. It
is evident that, at the least, the idea of a 'relief
development continuum' means very different things
to different people. This is true, notwithstanding the
current sense in many western development circles
that, with the end of the Cold War, we are in a period
of a 'new consensus' on international relief and de-
velopment action. A variety of practical constraints
and differences in perspective and ideology remains.
The article touches on four different sources of
confusion: the institutional considerations of donor
agencies; problems associated with development
ideology; the different perspectives of different
actors; and the opportunities created by crisis.
The sharp distinctions which are made here are
not intended to be mutually exclusive. It concludes
with an attempt to reconcile perspectives.1
2 SOURCES OF CONFUSION
2.1 Organizational considerations
In the post-Gulf War reorganization of the interna-
tional humanitarian system, very little considera-
tion appears to have been given to the practical
limitations on international action. If, for no other
reason than the administrative difficulties posed by
large budgets and multiple grants to other organiza-
tions, the larger Governmental donors tend to im-
pose limits on their support, e.g. through NGOs, to
relief, rehabilitation and development activities. The
distinctions vary from donor to donor, but typically
include limitations on action related to its time rela-
tionship with an emergency, and on the type of
l The note is unreferenced for the reason that to the best of the
author's knowledge the origin of many of these views is obscure -
some, for example, have been current within the author's own
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activity which is acceptable in relationship at each
period. The time limits are sometimes formal: for
example, for many years the US Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance could act only within 90 days
of a disaster. In other cases, time limits are decided
in relationship to the donors' perception of the evo-
lution of a specific case. The type of activity which
is acceptable in any period is generally implicit
rather than formally defined, but is usually broadly
limited by type. Thus, a proposal for food distribu-
tion in a famine would be acceptable 'relief activity';
but it might be difficult or impossible, depending on
the sophistication of the donor concerned, to obtain
such food in advance of a crisis. Such distinctions
and the flexibility of any donor vary widely between
donors and with time.
The reasons for this are not only administrative.
Donor 'flexibility' is clearly a complex function of
the political policy environment of the donor and
the confidence and knowledge of donor staff. The
increasing demand for public accountability is a
factor: more imaginative and effective work is
often 'open-ended' and therefore more risky, less
accountable and less acceptable. In high profile
emergencies, there is a need for donors to be seen
to satisfy the western public interest (sometimes
ahead of that of the recipient).
In the current period, when the donor field in-
creasingly dominated by a small number of large
donors and an increasing number of NGOs are largely
or entirely dependent on donor financing to work
at all, the definitions of 'relief', 'development' and
the transition between these is increasingly defined
by the donor position. At the extremes an 'emer-
gency' might not be deemed to exist at all i.e. does
not qualify for funding, if bilateral relationships
are sufficiently bad (e.g. the US Government and
northern Sudan); or it might last for a shorter
or longer time according to the procedures of the
donor concerned.
agency (SCF (UK)) for at least a decade and underpin much of its
dealings with other agencies and relief action - and because others
are discussed at greater length in other articles.
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These donor distinctions have practical implications.
The absolute cost of international relief tends to be
very high, and the return on the investment, so far as
this can be judged, poor. Most money is spent on
salaries and material which is immediately con-
sumed. Furthermore, relief is also, in some in-
stances, grossly inefficient in terms of improving the
welfare of the affected population. For example, the
course of the recent cholera epidemic in Goma,
which on the available estimate led to 17,000 deaths
from a population of 1 million, appears to have been
at best only marginally influenced by massive in-
ternational action. In the face of the recent huge
increase in the absolute cost of emergencies, there
is an obvious interest in reducing costs and
improving the efficiency of response.
There is, of course, a long history of attempts to get
better return on the relief investment, ranging from
the comparatively trivial, e.g. siting and designing a
relief water supply in such a way that it will have
value to the resident population after the emergency,
to the more important question of methods of 'relief'
which prevent disaster. The most common case
relates to 'economic emergencies' and specifically
the possibility of reducing the vulnerability of some
populations to anticipated food crisis.
The typical situation is of a population affected by
production failure from drought, where, to survive,
people will sell their livestock and other capital and
where some may require food aid to survive. A case
can be made that the provision of food aid before
the population is forced to realize capital would
sometimes involve much lower absolute costs, be
more 'economic' and more effective than interven-
tion after the event. For example, rough calculations
after the Darfur famine in 1985/86 (with Alex de
Waal), suggested that a smaller quantity of food
aid delivered early would have avoided the 'panic'
sale of livestock of a much greater value than
the cost of the relief operation, allowed the
population to retain its livestock, and reduced
their vulnerability to drought in subsequent years.
The routine practical implementation of such tech-
niques is of course more difficult - where, when and
how to intervene is a complex question - but there
are examples of the use of such techniques, for exam-
ple the purchase of cattle at subsidized rates in
Mali in the mid 1980s, where otherwise these would
have been to the owner a total loss. A different but
current case is the building and improvement of
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roads in the remoter famine prone areas of northern
Ethiopia. This could not be justified in conventional
economic terms; but would be easily justified in terms
of the huge savings in relief costs which will be ob-
tained, when, as is likely, crisis returns to that area.
2.2 Current ideas on development
'Donor' definitions can be seen from another per-
spective, in which there is no smooth continuum
from relief to development: they are simply different
things. The current dominant 'model' for develop-
ment is to be found in the theory underlying the
actions of the ¡MF and World Bank, i.e. in the
attempt to secure wealth creation within poor coun-
tries rather than wealth transfer from rich countries
to poor, largely practized through 'economic struc-
tural adjustment'. In this construction, the idea of
a temporal succession from relief to development
does not exist - they are different and essentially
dissociated activities, which require different condi-
tions to succeed. This distinction seems also to be
accepted implicitly in the new UN institutional
arrangements, which increasingly deal with relief
as an activity distinct from and in terms of structure
and control disconnected from, 'development'.
The case of Angola provides an example. The recent
savage 'second' war between the MPLA Govern-
ment and UNITA caused localized but large scale
starvation. At about the same time the country was
subjected to a sharp currency revaluation as part of
'economic structural adjustment'. The result, by
early 1994, was a situation where malnutrition was
on the decline and all but set to disappear in areas
receiving relief; while in the vast urban slums in the
capital and the coastal cities, well outside the war
zone, an already severe level of poverty grew worse,
with a steady increase in rates of severe malnutrition.
The juxtaposition of large sums being spent to feed
one group - food is delivered by air - where another
starves, is uncomfortable: but under the prevailing
economic theory the two actions are not necessarily
incompatible. 'Development' in, say, Huambo, a
UNITA held relief enclave, will occur as and if wider
conditions allow: the end of war and the resumption
of trade and access to agricultural inputs, reinvest-
ment in light industry, and the ability of a Govern-
ment to support education and health services.
These in turn depend on the political and economic
environment in the country at large and beyond.
There is no evident connection between the supply of
food aid and medical relief to people isolated by a
war, a purely temporary measure, and the poverty
and under-nutrition of compatriots in areas not
directly affected by conflict.
In Angola it might be argued that relief, rehabilita-
tion and development are happening simultane-
ously and independently. Leaving on one side the
questions of the effectiveness of structural adjust-
ment, the practical reality or effectiveness of 'safety
nets', and the problems of debt servicing, the case
that the ¡MF/World Bank have found a clear and
logical 'relief-development' continuum of their own
is a strong one.
2.3 Different perspectives
A developing country Government, a community
group or an individual, are likely to have rather
different views on the definitions of and practical
relationshipsbetween relief and development to those
of the larger donors.
For example, all parties may agree that a particular
drought or conflict has affected people in a way
which justifies relief: but the nature and balance of
concern will vary with the observer. The 'foreign'
interest may be from the perspective of starvation -
the public concern from the media exposure of
starvation or foreign policy considerations; the
National Government may acknowledge this but
be chiefly concerned with the effects of the crisis
on the economy; and people may fear hardship,
impoverishment or destitution, rather than the statis-
tically small risk of death.
Where power lies with the donor, the relief re-
sponse may be, as in Angola, in terms of food aid.
Where, as in India, Government has its own re-
sources and has been free to act independently
of donors, the relief response may include the
distribution of free - or subsidized - food, but will
generally centre on the need to protect incomes,
the market and larger capital investments. For
example in the drought of the mid-1980s, the State
of Gujarat spent immense sums on the procurement
and transportation of fodder to protect milk herds,
an investment which if lost would take years
to regain and (from the failure of milk supply to
urban areas) have immense political cost. It is
the author's impression that a competent national
perspective on the 'continuum' is generally broadly
the reverse of the international view i.e. for govern-
ments, 'disasters' are primarily 'economic' in impor-
tance; for the external world 'human'.
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The local perspective on appropriate disaster relief
and 'development' has had many major successes,
particularly outside Africa. The great storm-surge
disasters which have struck coastal Bangladesh have
caused deaths in the hundreds of thousands and are
typically seen by outside agencies as 'natural' disas-
ters, having primarily an immediate human effect.
But, paradoxically, flood surges create relatively
slight short term medical and other relief needs.
People are killed or survive, and there is often little
immediate medical need other than short term rescue
and first aid. The effects are primarily economic and
can be managed as such by the distribution of cash
and/or the intensification of 'normal' development
activities, support for the re-capitalization of the
normal domestic economy and the replacement of
public capital, for example the provision of housing
materials, seeds and tools, tube wells etc. Such
activities are, of course, often supported by interna-
tional donors and NGOs. The distinction between
relief and development in such cases may be a very
fine one: the very short-term problem of rescue aside,
the type of activity involved may be little or no
different to that associated with 'development'.
2.4 Crisis creating the conditions for
development
The possibility that crisis may create the conditions
for development has been advanced, chiefly in the
context of the Eritrean/Ethiopian war. Here it is
argued that one effect of the social and political
reorganization associated with war was to emanci-
pate womej and to create new social conditions and
possibilities for development. The case is not dis-
puted here except to say that this does not seem to be
a general phenomenon associated with war, and
may reflect as much the particular and unusual his-
tory of Northern Ethiopia prior to the war. More
widely, the question of the effect of previous disas-
ters on subsequent economic development is an
interesting one and clearly relevant to a view of
the relief-development continuum. Sound evidence
is slight and the nature of the argument does not
allow proof: but it is the author's impression that
there is a case that, as far as generalization is possible,
it is that crisis tends to accelerate processes already
underway prior to the emergency. This seems logical
- a place which is in economic decline from want of a
market for its produce, suitable skills or a remote
location is hardly likely to be stimulated into growth
after, say, an earthquake and a rehabilitation involv-
ing the replacement of housing, basic domestic
equipment and a few public buildings. Similarly, a
place meeting the conditions for economic growth
will not necessarily be slowed by calamity: indeed it
might well provide an economic incentive and an
opportunity to upgrade productive capital.
3 CONCLUSION: RECONCILING
PERSPECTIVES
The possibility of reconciling perspectives has al-
ready been touched on with the example of drought
relief in India and flood relief in Bangladesh and the
potential mismatch between 'foreign' and 'local'
perspectives and priorities. For 'development' it
has long been a question as to whether and how
international organizations can find a way better to
reconcile these positions. The topic, particularly as
regards development, is clearly large - it would
include, for example, much of the discussion on
participation - and well beyond the scope of this note.
But there are possibilities for similar approaches in
emergency relief, in the author's experience making
action much more effective and efficient.
If an emergency is seen not only as physical out-
comes, for example damage or deaths, but rather as
the product of a particular set of social, geographical
and economic circumstances, on which some
damaging event has been superimposed; and if it is
álso accepted that the 'local' perspective on these
events is both potentially legitimate and tends
to reflect deeper local knowledge; then it can be
argued that a more productive role can be defined
for the outsider providing relief. In practice the
interpretation of the 'local' view will tend neces-
sarily to be incomplete and biased; in practice also
it requires a close working association with the
country and people concerned.
For example, recent events in Somalia can be seen
and represented in sharply different ways. To the
mass media - and one is tempted to say to some
western Governments - the country was in a state of
'anarchy', controlled by demonized 'warlords', served
by the unswerving loyalty of 'clans' and prepared
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coldly to murder or inflict starvation on their fellows.
Although there is an element of truth in this, the
situation could also be represented as one arising
from the unusual history of the country, that it had
never properly amounted to a nation state in the
generally accepted use of the term at any time, and
that conditions, vile as they were in many localized
areas, were far from anarchic. Indeed, one could
argue that, within Somali society, there was a con-
stant and surprisingly effective tendency to reorgan-
ize at local level (often with foreign support) to
provide services. For example, the formation of a
Ministry of Health - in fact, two, for north and south
Mogadishu - which had begun contacts even during
the war. Furthermore, one could argue that starva-
tion was localized and, to a large extent, a conse-
quence of an unusual, geographically based economy,
and of a dependence on trade which was disrupted
by the war. In this construction, the 'warlords',
odious as they appear to westerners and many
westernized Somalis, are what pass in the circum-
stances for legitimate 'politicians'.
The Somali case illustrates the argument that the
perspective dictates the approach taken to relief and
development. One, dominant, view was that order
must be brought by force; a second was that the role
of the outsider, as far as possible, was to minimize the
effects of the civil war on the population, while
allowing the continued evolution of the local po-
litical process, extreme as this was in Somalia. The
practical types of actions in the two cases vary only in
detail - in the setting of Somalia food and health
programmes, for example, the difference lies in the
choice of the particular activities chosen and the
relationship of the outsider to them. To take a sum-
mary example is it more effective and efficient in the
short and long run to supply a complete surgical
hospital and its staff and equipment from outside; or
to support the organized efforts of Somali surgeons
in the existing hospital? Could it be that food could
have been more effectively and easily distributed
using existing market and trading systems than by
enormously costly armed convoys?
